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Gender and Other Disadvantages: A REvIEw OF JUSTICE AND
GENDER. By Deborah L. Rhode. Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press. 1989. Pp. 428. $39.50
REVIEWED BY RUTHANN ROBSON*
T HE TASK Deborah Rhode sets for herself in this ambitious book
is nothing less than an exploration of the law's responses to gen-
der discrimination within their broader cultural contexts.' To an admi-
rable extent, the book accomplishes this goal. Even more admirable is
that it accomplishes this goal in slightly over 300 pages (excluding
notes), producing a well written, highly readable, and comprehensive
survey of the legal issues relevant to contemporary women. Thus,
Professor Rhode's book is a valuable primer for attorneys, scholars,
or law students wishing to acquaint themselves with the burgeoning
topic known as "women and the law."
Rhode's Justice and Gender, however, is more than a comprehen-
sive exploration. My personal penchant is for efforts that surpass ex-
amination, however useful examination may be. If feminism as
critique is necessary, I find it ultimately insufficient. 2 Thus, I am de-
lighted to find a feminist legal tract that takes an active theoretical
stance rather than a merely reactive one. Whatever criticisms I, or
others, direct at the book, the criticisms must always be mitigated by
the ambition, risk, and creativity evinced in advancing a positive pro-
grammatic paradigm for feminism.
* Visiting Associate Professor of Law, CUNY Law School at Queen's College; B.A.,
1976, Ramapo College; J.D., 1979, Stetson University College of Law; LI.M., 1990, University
of California at Berkeley (Boalt Hall).
1. D. RHODE, Jus'rcE AND GENDERa 1 (1989).
2. 1 am using "critique" here in its narrow, and perhaps unfeminist, sense. Certainly, the
critical process can encompass advocating change. In an introduction to their feminist anthol-
ogy, theorists Jeffner Allen and Iris Marion Young describe the contributions they selected:
Critique as it appears in these papers does not take, primarily, the form of refutation,
the dismantling of claims and arguments to reveal inconsistencies, invaidities,
counter-examples, and absurd implications. Critique is exercised in the sense of show-
ing the limits of a mode of thinking by forging an awareness of alternative, and more
liberating, ideas, symbols, and discourse.
Introduction to THE THnmano Musa: FEMNISM AND MODERN FRENCH PHnosopsy 13 (J. Allen
& I.M. Young eds. 1989) [hereinafter THE THINKINo MusE]. Examples of this type of critique
appear not only in the Allen and Young anthology exploring American feminist appropriations
of French philosophies (notably post-structuralism), but also in the anthology FEWSmSM AS CRI-
TiQ E (S. Benhabib & D. Cornell eds. 1987) that explores many political and legal issues.
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What Rhode refers to as a "primary objective" or "central strategy"
of the book is to "reorient legal doctrine from its traditional focus on
sex-based difference toward a concern with sex-based disadvantage." 3
The reorientation to disadvantage is aimed at surmounting the same-
ness/difference dilemma that has confounded and occupied so many
feminist legal theoreticians: 4 Should women be accorded the same legal
treatment as men, or are there some instances in which women should
be afforded different legal treatment? The employment context illus-
trates this dilemma. The position that women are the same as men justi-
fied such obfuscations of reality as the Supreme Court's distinction
between "pregnant and nonpregnant persons," the latter category in-
cluding both women and men, that was used to uphold discrimination
against a woman because she was pregnant. 5 The position that women
are different from men historically has justified bars on women entering
certain professions, including law, 6 and has justified protectionist legisla-
tion that limited the number of hours women could work. 7 Yet, as
Rhode correctly observes, the dilemma remains pronounced, most re-
cently in employers' stratification of jobs that may affect the reproduc-
tive capacities of women of childbearing age and in maternity leave
3. D. RHODE, supra note 1, at 1, 3.
4. See, e.g., Z. EisENsTTmr, THE FEMALE BODY AND THE LAW (1988); Lahey, Feminist The-
ories of (Jn)Equality, 3 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 5 (1987); Littleton, Equality Across Difference: A
Place for Rights Discourse?, 3 Wis. WoMN's L.J. 189 (1987); Majury, Strategizing In Equality,
3 WIS. WOMEN's L.J. 169 (1987).
5. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 n.20 (1974). The Supreme Court later solidi-
fied its conclusion that discrimination against pregnant "persons" was not discrimination
against persons on account of their sex (and thus prohibited) in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,
429 U.S. 125, 135-36 (1976) and Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977). Congress later
passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, §1, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978), that
amended Title VII to include prohibitions of discrimination based on pregnancy. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(k) (1982).
The issue of pregnancy as a "special" condition of women sparked debate among feminist
legal theorists. See, e.g., Kay, Equality and Difference: The Case of Pregnancy, 1 BERKELEY
WOMEN's L.J. 1 (1985); Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Spe-
cial Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. Rav. L. & Soc. CHANOE 325 (1984/85).
6. Bradwell v. Miller, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873) (upholding Illinois' denial of a license
to practice law on the grounds that the applicant was female); In re Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116
(1894) (following Bradwell and holding that Virginia's statute providing what "persons" could
be admitted to the practice of law was properly defined as "male persons").
For a discussion of women in the legal profession, see K.B. MoREL.o, TiE INvIsIBLE BAR
(1986).
7. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
8. D. RHODE, supra note 1, at 96. For a discussion of this as "protective" legislation in an
historical context, see Becker, From Muller v. Oregon to Fetal Vulnerability Policies, 53 U. Cm.
L. REa. 1219 (1986). The issue of excluding women of childbearing years from potentially toxic
workplaces is presently before the United States Supreme Court in Auto Workers v. Johnson
Controls, Inc., No. 89-1215, 59 USLW 3304 (argued Oct. 10, 1990).
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provisions .9
Rhode's disadvantage paradigm presupposes a "substantive com-
mitment to gender equality" that requires analysis of sex-based differ-
ences with reference to whether such differences are "more likely to
reduce or to reinforce sex-based disparities in political power, social
status, and economic diversity."' 0 In the employment context, Rhode
thus argues:
From a disadvantage-oriented perspective, the preferable approach
is to press for the broadest possible maternal, parental, and medical
coverage for all workers. Sex-neutral strategies pose the least risk of
entrenching stereotypes or encouraging covert discrimination and
offer the widest range of protections for disadvantaged groups....
From this perspective, even the formulation of the "special
treatment-equal treatment" debate is misconceived. To view
childbirth-related policies as "special" assumes that male needs
establish the norm .... We cannot afford a repetition of earlier
struggles over preferential treatment, in which women spent too
much of their energy fighting each other over the value of
protection, rather than uniting to challenge the conditions that made
protection so valuable."
Rhode's ultimate position is that the sameness/difference dichotomy
is one of the "False Dichotomies" explored in her book and that the
gender dichotomy itself may be another false dichotomy. It is gender
that is finally elided in favor of "broader" based programs and re-
forms.
Eliding gender works much less effectively in the area of sexual vio-
lence. Rhode's adoption of the disadvantage paradigm is a specific
rejection of the dominance paradigm advanced by another activist
feminist legal theorist, Catharine MacKinnon. For MacKinnon, "sex-
uality is gendered as gender is sexualized. Male and female are created
through the erotization of dominance and submission.' ' 2 Women's
9. D. RHODE, supra note 1, at 119-23. The dispute over maternity leave provisions oc-
curred in the context of California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987). As
Rhode notes, groups such as Equal Rights Advocates, Western Center for Law and Poverty,
Mexican-American Legal Defense and Education Fund, Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles,
and Coalition for Reproductive Equality in the Workplace supported the California pregnancy
leave statute, while groups such as ACLU, NOW, National Women's Political Caucus, Wom-
en's Legal Defense Fund, and National Women's Law Center opposed the pregnancy leave stat-
ute. Id. at 355 n.22. The Court upheld the statute.
10. D. RHODE, supra note 1, at 3, 4.
11. Id. at 124-25.
12. C. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 113 (1989).
1991l
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inequality is based on their collective condition of being dominated by
men. 13 Rhode finds the dominance paradigm "too often theoretically
reductive and strategically counterproductive,' 4 although she notes:
This is not to suggest that disadvantage is always a preferable
paradigm .... For some theoretical, political, and legal purposes,
dominance remains a crucial organizing principle; one does not, for
example, speak of rape or pornography as questions of
disadvantage. What again bears emphasis is the importance of
contextual analysis. 5
Yet when Rhode contextually analyzes rape and pornography, she
does not necessarily employ the dominance paradigm. Although
Rhode suggests that rape should be reconceptualized as the "product
of power" and advocates that we "challenge the social understandings
of sexuality that legitimate" rape,' 6 she never attributes the power or
the social understandings specifically to male dominance.
Similarly, in the contextual analysis of pornography, Rhode suc-
cessfully employs neither the disadvantage nor the dominance para-
digm. Although insightful, Rhode's context does not provide any
helpful reorientation of the law for feminists concerned with pornog-
raphy. Instead, analogizing to the Equal Rights Amendment, Rhode
denominates pornography a "symbolic single issue crusade" and sug-
gests that "it is appropriate to reconsider whether pornography is the
issue upon which so much energy should center."1 7 To pose this ques-
tion is to answer it.
The theme of contextualization seems to replace the advancement
of the disadvantage paradigm whenever Rhode's disadvantage para-
digm cannot adequately reorient the law. While contextualization of-
ten accomplishes the feminist goal of focusing on the lives of real
women rather than abstract principles,18 from an activist theoretical
stance, contextualization as a replacement for the disadvantage para-
digm accounts for some of the weakest portions of the book. Notably,
the chapter on "Sex and Violence," containing discussions of rape,
13. Id. at 241.
14. D. RHODE, supra note 1, at 83.
15. Id. at 85.
16. Id. at 252-53.
17. Id. at 272-73.
18. Rhode often acknowledges the impact of litigation on the lives of real women. For
example, Rhode notes the costs to women of bringing claims of sexual harassment. Id. at 234.
For an enlightening discussion of the experience of bringing an employment discrimination
claim, written by a female law professor denied tenure at University of California-Berkeley
(Boalt Hall), see Swift, Becoming a Plaintiff, 4 BERKELEY WOMEN's L.J. 245 (1989).
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pornography, sexual harassment, domestic violence, and prostitution,
suffers from the lack of a theoretical framework. The territory of sex-
ual violence has been compellingly charted by Catharine MacKinnon;
Rhode's work in this area would prompt comparisons with Mac-
Kinnon, even if Rhode did not explicitly reject MacKinnon's domi-
nance theory. Concerning the role of law, Rhode implicitly both
rejects and incorporates MacKinnon by repeating both that law is cru-
cial, but not central, to ending violence against women and that legal
remedies alone are not a substitute for cultural change.1 9 Nevertheless,
Rhode's invocation of "social realities" remains abstract, even where
she invokes details. 20 Perhaps this is because Rhode's contextualized
prose cannot match the power of MacKinnon's compelling rhetoric. 21
19. In Rhode's discussion of pornography, for example, she implicitly adopts the position
that the MacKinnon-Dworkin pornography ordinance promoted exclusively legal remedies and
that "anti-pornography activists" would not accept alternative measures such as "boycotts, pro-
tests, mass-media campaigns, workshops, and curricular material for public schools." D.
RHODE, supra note 1, at 271-72.
Yet Rhode's acknowledgment of the limits of the law is also shared by MacKinnon, who wrote
in the preface to her book:
This book is not an idealist argument that law can solve the problems of the world
or that if legal arguments are better made, courts will see the error of their ways. It
recognizes the power of the state and the consciousness-and legitimacy-conferring
power of law as political realities that women ignore at their peril. It recognizes the
legal forum as a particularly but not singularly powerful one.
C. MAcKINNON, supra note 12, at xiii.
The idea that law should be de-centered in feminist programs occurs in many feminist tracts,
including a recent British contribution, C. SMART, FEMrNIsM AND THE POWER OF LAW (1989),
that, relying on MacKinnon's earlier work, accuses "that MacKinnon sees no division between
law, the state, and society. For here [sic] these are virtually interchangeable concepts-they are
all manifestations of male power." Id. at 81.
20. For example, when considering domestic violence, Rhode writes:
As long as women are economically dependent on men, and both sexes are socialized
to accept male aggression and female passivity, abuse will remain pervasive. Changing
the conditions that foster violence requires changing cultural perspectives and priori-
ties. It demands sustained challenges to media presentations, educational programs,
and social services. In order for women to leave an abusive relationship, they must be
able to support themselves and their children. Ensuring opportunities for economic
independence will require restructuring a vast range of social policies regarding em-
ployment, education, divorce, legal services, childcare, housing, and welfare. Only as
women achieve equality in the public sphere are they likely to break patterns of ag-
gression and submission in the private sphere.
D. RHODE, supra note 1, at 244.
21. For example, although Rhode and MacKinnon share some observations concerning rape
reform, their rhetorical emphasis is different:
The crime of rape must be reconceptualized as the product of power, which can be
exercised in ways other than physical force. The injury of rape must be redefined to
reflect the experience of fear, betrayal, and degradation that results from sexual coer-
cion by social acquaintances as well as strangers. Attention must center on the coer-
civeness of the act rather than the relationship of the parties. Such redefinitions
cannot occur only through statutes. They require other measures such as rape counsel-
888 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18:883
Or perhaps this is because Rhode's work might be an example of
MacKinnon's observation that "it has become customary to affirm
that sexuality is socially constructed. Seldom specified is what, so-
cially, it is constructed of, far less who does the constructing or how,
when, or where." 22
ing and crisis centers and educational programs for judges, law-enforcement person-
nel, and the general public.
The point of reform is not simply to improve remedies for reported rapes but to
alter their preconditions. Regional and cross-cultural comparisons suggest that sexual
assault rates are lower in societies where women have gained greater influence, re-
spect, and socioeconomic status. Studies of American rapists' attitudes have revealed
a striking absence of guilt and a consistent perception of their conduct as normal sex-
ual behavior. One critical function of law reform campaigns is to politicize those per-
ceptions and focus attention on their broader ideological roots.
D. RHODE, supra note 1, at 252-53 (citations omitted).
Rape is a sex-specific violation. Not only are the victims of rape overwhelmingly
women, perpetrators overwhelmingly men, but also the rape of women by men is inte-
gral to the way inequality between the sexes occurs in life. Intimate violation with
impunity is an ultimate index of social power. Rape both evidences and practices
women's low status relative to men. Rape equates female with violable and female
sexuality with forcible intrusion in a way that defines and stigmatizes the female sex as
a gender. Threat of sexual assault is threat of punishment for being female. The state
has laws against sexual assault but it does not enforce them....
Rape should be defined as sex by compulsion, of which physical force is one form.
Lack of consent is redundant and should not be a separate element of the crime. Ex-
panding this analysis would support as sex equality initiatives laws keeping women's
sexual histories out of rape trials and publication bans on victims' names and identi-
ties. The defense of mistaken belief in consent-which measures whether a rape oc-
curred from the standpoint of the (male) perpetrator-would violate women's sex
equality rights by law because it takes the male point of view on sexual violence
against women. Similarly, the systematic failure of the state to enforce the rape law
effectively or at all excludes women from equal access to justice, permitting women to
be savaged on a mass scale, depriving them of equal protection and equal benefit of
the laws.
C. MAcKINNON, supra note 12, at 245-46 (citations omitted).
22. C. MACKINNON, supra note 12, at 131. MacKinnon continues with a particularly effec-
tive metaphor:
Power is everywhere therefore nowhere, diffuse rather than pervasively hegemonic.
"Constructed" seems to mean influenced by, directed, channeled, as a highway con-
structs traffic patterns. Not: Why cars? Who's driving? Where's everybody going?
What makes mobility matter? Who can own a car? Are all these accidents not very
accidental?
Id.
At the beginning of the passage, MacKinnon describes this tendency as "post-Lacan, actually
post-Foucault," invoking two very different French postmodernists. For a discussion of post-
modernist influence on feminism, see infra note 24. For a further elaboration of MacKinnon's
point that postmodernist influence may be debilitating to the feminist agenda, see Bordo, Femi-
nism, Postmodernism, and Gender-Scepticism, in FEhmNISM/POSTMODERNIsM 133 (L. Nicholson
ed. 1990).
MacKinnon's observation is applicable to Rhode's work. Concerning domestic violence,
Rhode indicts the socialization of "both sexes" and places the semantic responsibility for break-
ing "patterns of aggression" on "women." D. RHODE, supra note 1, at 244. Concerning rape,
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Rhode's book, however, is much less likely to incur the sharp criti-
cism that MacKinnon's work has evoked. 23 It is important to note that
Rhode's emphasis on contextualization occurs in a hospitable intellec-
tual climate. Critical theory in general has embraced postmodern the-
ory, with its rejection of "grand narratives." 24 Many feminists have
also expressed disenchantment with feminism's grand narratives that
totalize and essentialize women. 25  Likewise, some feminist legal
although Rhode refers to "social acquaintances," "strangers," and "rapists," these perpetra-
tors are ungendered. Id. at 252-53.
Although there are many differences-as well as similarities-between Rhode and Mac-
Kinnon, the assignment of blame and responsibility is crucially distinct. For Rhode, women are
disadvantaged, but it makes little sense to say "men disadvantage women." For MacKinnon,
women are dominated, and the sense of that is that "men dominate women."
23. See, e.g., infra note 25. See also Bartlett, MacKinnon's Feminism: Power on Whose
Terms? (Book Review), 75 CALIF. L. REv. 1559 (1987); Harris, Categorical Discourse and Domi-
nance Theory (Book Review), 5 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 181 (1990).
In the preface to Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, MacKinnon implicitly responds to
critiques of her work as being totalizing. While MacKinnon apparently accepts that feminism is
"an epic indictment in search of a theory, an epic theory in need of writing," C. MACKINNON,
supra note 12, at xi, she nevertheless states:
To look for the place of gender in everything is not to reduce everything to gender.
For example, it is not possible to discuss sex without taking account of Black wom-
en's experience of gender. To the considerable degree to which this experience is insep-
arable from the experience of racism, many features of sex cannot be discussed
without racial particularity. I attempt to avoid the fetishized abstractions of race and
class (and sex) which so commonly appear under the rubric "difference" and to ana-
lyze experiences and demarcating forces that occupy society concretely and particu-
larly-for example, "Black women" instead of "racial differences." All women
possess ethnic (and other definitive) particularities that mark their femaleness; at the
same time their femaleness marks their particularities and constitutes one. Such a rec-
ognition, far from undermining the feminist project, comprises, defines, and sets stan-
dards for it. It also does not reduce race to sex.
Id. at xi-xii.
24. J-F. LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION 15, 31-47 (1984). For an excellent discus-
sion explaining postmodernism as an aesthetic and a politic, see Huyssen, Mapping the Post-
modern, in FEMINISM/POSTMODERNISM, supra note 22, at 234.
Rhode herself invokes the "postmodernist currents" that have "underscored the inadequacy
of traditional universalist approaches in social criticism" to support her conclusion that "we
need theory without Theory; we need fewer universal frameworks and more contextual analy-
sis." D. RHODE, supra note 1, at 315-16.
25. As expressed by two contemporary feminists:
Partly because of the challenges by women of color and by Third World women to the
white women's movement, and partly because of the critique lesbians have brought to
heterosexist assumptions of the feminist movement, a critique of essentialism and a
formulation of theories of difference have become integral to feminist discussion in
the United States. Claims, frequently French inspired, that to define a common wom-
en's oppression is inappropriately essentialist, have motivated many American femi-
nists to withdraw from the categorical claim that there is a single system of patriarchal
expression.
THE TmNKING MUSE, supra note 2, at 12-13. The indictment of feminism as being essentialist
with regard to race is elaborated in E. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION
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theorists are beginning to criticize feminist legal theory as being exclu-
sionary, totalizing, and essentialist.2 6 Thus, Rhode's insistence on con-
textualization situates the book within current critical theory;
contextualization also situates the book within feminist realizations
that not all women are identical and that one theory cannot explain all
women 27
In order to realize her project, Rhode attempts to do more in
Justice and Gender than recite contextualities such as class, race, sex-
ual orientation, ethnicity, and age-she attempts to integrate them
into her theory. Because of Rhode's own methodology-and because I
also believe that such contextualization is necessary-each contextual-
ity merits critical discussion. The book's attention and insight into
these various contextualities is disparate: compelling on class, incon-
sistent on race, predictable on sexual orientation, limited on age, and
scant on both ethnicity and disability.
Class consciousness permeates Justice and Gender in a refreshing
manner. Rhode does not merely differentiate deviances from the mid-
dle-class, she characterizes legal problems and formulates paradig-
matic solutions with attention to class consequences. To again use the
employment context as an example, Rhode not only necessarily dis-
cusses noncommission sales clerks at Sears, federal employees, tuna
fishers, and women in "law, management and academia," but also
confronts the class-based accusation that comparable worth schemes
necessitate that the "maintenance man will be paid less so the [female]
librarian can be paid more." ' 28 Class, including poverty, also informs
IN FEMINIST THOUGHT (1988).
The articles in the past fifteen years engaging in an internal critique of feminism as being
classist, heterosexist, anti-Semitic, racist, and Anglophile are too numerous to cite here. None-
theless, two recent anthologies collecting works by women of color, Third World women, and
lesbians (as well as by many women who fit into all of these categories) are extraordinary and do
bear citation: LESBIAN PHIosoPIES AD CULTURES (J. Allen ed. 1990) and MAKING FACE, MAK-
ING SoUL/HACIENDO CARAS: CREATIVE AND CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES BY WOMEN OF COLOR (G.
Anzaldua ed. 1990).
26. See, e.g., Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4 BERKELEY WOMEN'S
L.J. 191 (1989) (focusing on the perspective of lesbians); Harris, Race and Essentialism in Femi-
nist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990) (focusing on the perspective of black women);
Kline, Race, Racism and Feminist Legal Theory, 12 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 115 (1989) (focusing
on race from the perspective of a member of the "dominant" race).
27. Rhode is, of course, not alone in seeking to situate her legal theory within current intel-
lectual practices. In addition to the sources cited supra note 26, other examples include Z. EISEN-
STEIN, supra note 4 (advocating a "radical pluralist method for thinking about how difference
constitutes the meaning of equality") and C. SMART, supra note 19 (rejecting the "unity of law"
and proposing that feminists concentrate on the law's power rather than reforming the law).
28. D. RHODE, supra note 1, at 194 (quoting Scales-Trent, Comparable Worth: Is This a
Theory for Black Workers?, 8 WoMEN's RTS. L. REP. 51 (1984) (quoting Michael Horowitz)).
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Rhode's inclusion of welfare policies, a subject too often missing in"gender" studies, 29 and is also integrated into treatment of reproduc-
tive issues such as abortion3 ° and surrogacy.3 1
Class consciousness does not compensate, however, for the lack of
age and disability as relevant contextualizations except in terms of
class: the section on welfare policy, "Benign and Invidious Discrimi-
nation in Welfare Policy: Elderly Women and Social Security, ' 3 2 and
a few other scattered passages, address both age and disability only in
terms of economic dependency. Yet age is more than an economic
matter,3" as is disability. 4 The absence of disabled politics is especially
regrettable in a discussion of reproductive issues that mentions fetal
"deformities" and "defects." 35 Ethnicity is often listed as a relevant
contextuality, but it remains unexplored. Any references to anti-Semi-
tism escaped my notice. 6
Race is a consideration throughout Justice and Gender, but it
proves problematic both theoretically and practically. Theoretically,
See also EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (judicial acceptance
of Sears' claims that women preferred the flexibility of lower paying non-commission sales posi-
tions and that underrepresentation of women in the higher paying commission sales positions
was not gender discrimination), aff'd, 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988). See D. RHODE, supra note 1,
at 180, for Rhode's brief discussion of EEOC v. Sears. For a more extensive discussion of the
case, see Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REv. 797, 813-21 (1989).
29. For an exception, see Phinney, Feminism, Epistemology and the Rhetoric of Law:
Reading Bowen v. Gilliard, 12 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 151 (1989) (discussing the United States
Supreme Court case which upheld a Congressional amendment that altered allowable exclusions
of otherwise supported children from "family units," and thus drastically impacted AFDC reci-
pients).
30. D. RHODE, supra note 1, at 213-14.
31. Id. at 228-29. Rhode's analysis of abortion and her analysis of surrogacy are not suffi-
ciently radical in terms of class. For example, in the surrogacy context, Rhode acknowledges the
existence of "class exploitation," but seems to excuse it because it is "not unique to the surro-
gacy context." Id. at 229.
32. Id. at 112-17.
33. For discussions of ageism within feminist theory, see B. COOPER, OVER THE HiL: RE-
FLECTIONS ON AGEISM BETWEEN WOMEN (1988); B. MACDONALD & C. RICH, LooK ME IN THE
EYE: OLD WOMEN, AGING AN'D AGEISM (1987).
34. For discussions of disability, see WITH THE POWER OF EACH BREATH: A DISABLED WOM-
EN'S ANTHOLOGY (S. Browne, D. Connors & N. Stern eds. 1985) [hereinafter WITH Ti POWER
OF EACH BREATH].
35. D. RHODE, supra note 1, at 208, 212. For an excellent discussion of feminist reproduc-
tive rights rhetoric from the perspective of a disabled person, see Finger, Claiming All Of Our
Bodies Reproductive Rights and Disability, in WITH THE POWER OF EACH BREATH, supra note
34, at 292.
36. For discussions concerning anti-Semitism, see NICE JEWISH GIRLS: A LESBIAN ANTHOL-
OGY (E.T. Beck ed. 1982); THE TRIBE OF DINA: A JEWISH WOMEN'S ANTHOLOGY (M. Kaye/Kan-
trowitz & I. Klepfisz eds. 1986).
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the problem is the interchangeability of race and gender as legal classi-
fications. Gender discrimination has never achieved the status of enti-
tlement to strict scrutiny that racial discrimination has, because-as
Rhode quotes from Justice Powell's opinion in the Bakke 7 reverse
discrimination case-gender discrimination does not share the
"lengthy and tragic history" of racial classifications. 8 Rhode notes
the continuing debate concerning whether race and sex are co-exten-
sive legal categories, but then explicitly refuses to endorse an "unqual-
ified analogy" and concludes that "race-based paradigms. . . cannot
capture the complexities of gender." 3 9 Rhode, however, nevertheless
often implicitly equates race and gender classifications by using race
as a yardstick to measure gender. For example, Rhode argues that"sex but not race has constituted a permissible occupational qualifica-
tion suggests limitations both in our commitment to eradicating gen-
der discrimination and in our understanding of its origins."4° She also
states that "[wle do not require plaintiffs in race-discrimination cases
to prove that management was aware of subordinates' racism; plain-
tiffs in sex-harassment cases should be treated no differently.' '41
Practically, the problem is the enmeshment of race and gender as
lived realities. Rhode honors the category of "woman," so that mi-
nority is not the exclusively male or ungendered male-female category
reflected in the phraseology "women and minorities. ' 42 The task, as
Rhode seems to realize, is not merely to include the experience of
Afra-American women within an Angla concept of women, for exam-
ple. Yet at too many points, with little or no explication, descriptive
passages include statements such as "biases against racial and ethnic
minorities have left women of color doubly disadvantaged." 43
More than a further explication of disadvantage, however, I often
wanted a sense of the ramifications of that disadvantage for the solu-
tion posed. For example, how does the confluence of race and sex
37. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 303 (1978).
38. D. RHODE, supra note 1, at 88.
39. Id. at 89-90.
40. Id. at 96.
41. Id. at 235-36.
42. See, e.g., Chused, The Hiring and Retention of Minorities and Women on American
Law School Faculties, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 537 (1988). In the eighteen statistical tables as well as
the text of this otherwise informative article, "minorities" are never gendered, and "women"
are never raced or ethnicized.
43. D. RHODE, supra note 1, at 168. The "doubly" disadvantaged methodology is persua-
sively criticized by Elizabeth Spelman in her chapter on "Gender & Race: The Ampersand Prob-
lem in Feminist Thought," in which she argues that the "additive analysis" of race and gender
(as well as class) obscures and confuses rather than clarifies. E. SPELMAN, supra note 25, at 114-
32.
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discrimination laws operate to obscure discrimination on the race/sex
axis-and how can such obfuscation be redressed?4 And how do con-
structions of women's sexuality by the dominant culture along racial
lines, e.g., Asian women as submissive and Latin women as highly
sexual, affect the call to "challenge the social understandings of sexu-
ality that legitimate" rape?45 While the tactic of isolating the experi-
ences of women of color (or others) into a separate section can be
ghettoizing, in this case I craved an extensive and coherent treatment
of the subject.
The lesbian experience does merit its own six page section, but this
section does not counteract the inconsistent cataloguing of sexual ori-
entation among other relevant contextualities. More distressingly, this
section does not serve as an antidote to the heterosexism inherent in
conclusions that it is "disturbing" that more career women do not
marry and have children," or that "working couples" means hus-
bands and wives 47 or that male children need fathers," or that sex-
segregated education for women is "compensatory" and "separatist
education requires rethinking. ' 49 Further, within Rhode's section
about "Lesbian-Gay Rights," lesbians, unlike other women, are cate-
gorized with "their" men: gay men. This strategy is a predictable-
and disappointing-one that de-genders the category sexual orienta-
tion. 0 Not surprisingly, such a de-genderization has gendered conse-
quences. For example, in the discussion of marriage as a legally
denied option to lesbians and gay men, Rhode concludes that the legal
"framework preoccupied with difference [between homosexuals and
heterosexuals] has thus served to perpetuate disadvantage." 5 The dis-
advantage Rhode identifies is the denial "not only [of] formal recog-
44. I am thinking here of a specific example from my own previous practice of law. A huge
multi-national employer in a relatively rural area employed over a thousand people, none of
whom were black women although the geographic employment area was significantly (if not
predominantly) composed of black women. The company's defense to employment discrimina-
tion was that it did not commit race discrimination because 30% of its workforce was black-the
fact that all blacks were men and in labor positions was irrelevant, and it did not commit sex
discrimination because 30% of its workforce was female-the fact that all women were white
and in clerical positions was irrelevant. Certainly Rhode's contexualizations assist in the percep-
tion of the problem, yet the emphasis on disadvantage does little to assist in the construction of a
remedy.
45. D. RHODE, supra note 1, at 253.
46. Id. at 175.
47. Id. at 167.
48. Id. at 123.
49. Id. at 299.
50. Id. at 141-46. For similar feminist discussions that de-gender sexual orientation, see C.
MAcKINNON, supra note 12, at 248; Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender,
1988 Wis. L. Rav. 187.
51. D. RHODE, supra note 1, at 145 (citations omitted).
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nition of their relationships but also a host of economic benefits that
follow from marital status, including tax, inheritance, insurance, wel-
fare, support, Social Security, and pension entitlements. '5 2 Yet les-
bian theory and experience may not perceive formal recognition as
necessarily advantageous and may further challenge economic benefits
directed at the few, such as employee "spousal" insurance, in favor
of broader based concepts such as national health care, especially in
light of the gendered practical existence of many lesbians as underem-
ployed when compared with gay men. 3 Rhode's failure to recognize
distinctions between lesbians and gay men is especially egregious given
her recognition that in other contexts, such as pregnancy, what is
more appropriately desired is more accessible health care for every-
one.5 4
Lesbian conceptions of justice might be distinct, just as conceptions
of justice may vary by racial, ethnic, cultural, religious, disability, and
age identities. While Justice and Gender ends with the inspirational
thought that "[bly broadening our aspirations to justice, we may
come closer to attaining it,"" as it began with the prospect that "we
may deepen our perceptions of justice and the strategies for achieving
it, ' '56 what remains unclear is the version of justice to be attained and
achieved. Rhode never defines justice, which is consistent with the em-
phasis on context, but which is inconsistent with the definitional con-
frontation of feminism and gender that preoccupy the text, however
briefly. 7 It is justice-despite its contextual permutations-that is to-
talized and essentialized," rather than gender.
Justice and Gender is a book that deserves critical attention: this is
a compliment that I do not make lightly. With its activist theoretical
52. Id. at 145.
53. For voices on lesbian theory and experience, see Robson & Valentine, Lov(h)ers: Lesbi-
ans as Intimate Partners and Lesbian Legal Theory, 64 TEMPLE L. REv. 90 (1990); Ettlebrick,
Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, 6 OuT/LooK 9 (1989).
54. See supra notes 8 & 9 and accompanying text.
55. D. RHODE, supra note 1, at 321.
56. Id. at 6.
57. D. RHODE, supra note 1, at 5. Rhode seeks to "avoid semantic tangles" by using the
term "feminist" in its most general sense and "by distinguishing where appropriate among dis-
tinctive strands of feminist thought or activity." Id. (citation omitted). For an elaboration of the
"distinctive strands" of feminist thought, including definitions of liberal, radical, cultural and
poststructuralist (postmodern), see Alcoff, Cultural Feminism Versus Post-Structuralism: The
Identity Crisis in Feminist Theory, 13 SIGNS: J. OF WOMEN CULTURE & Soc'Y 405 (1988); Offen,
Defining Feminism: A Comparative Historical Approach, 14 SIGNS: J. OF WOMEN CULTURE &
Soc'Y 119 (1988).
Rhode uses "gender" to refer to "predominantly cultural dynamics" and "sex" to refer to
"clear biological classifications." D. RHODE, supra note 1, at 5.
58. For possible meanings of justice, see Robson, Lesbian Jurisprudence?, 8 J.L. & INE-
QUALITY (1990) (forthcoming).
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stance, it advances ideas in a systematic and comprehensive manner.
Whether or not one agrees with the direction of the book's reorienta-
tion from difference to disadvantage, or with particular suggestions,
Justice and Gender is a worthwhile contribution to feminist legal
scholarship. Such contributions enable us to theorize, practice, and
realize justice-whatever that may be-for all of our selves.
C
